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Abstract
Over the past 30-40 years, consumer debt has grown substantially faster than income in the United States.
As a result, consumption has grown fast relative to national income. The economic growth that we have experienced
in the US economy has shown to be unreliable as demonstrated by the Great Recession in 2007-2008. By creating
unstable growth, consumer behavior could be an explanation behind the recession as well as the cause of future
economic downturns. This paper implements a new theory of consumption practices and tests for the stability of
economic growth and sustainability of consumer debt by using a neo-Kaleckian growth model.

	
  

3	
  

1 Introduction
When the Great Recession affected the global economy in 2008, many people wondered
what were some of the underlying economic causes of such a crisis. In the US specifically, the
housing bubble was one of the major explicit dilemmas that drew attention. While the outward
economic issues were obvious, it has become prudent to investigate what some of the possible
underlying issues were that caused the Great Recession.
One theory is that the sudden reduction in economic growth was the end result of
increased consumer spending. While Keynesian economists argue that increasing consumption
actually boosts demand-led growth, there have been innovations to consumption practicies over
the past few decades that could have potentially proved hazardous. In the US specifically,
consumption has increased at a much faster pace than disposable income over the past halfcentury or so, while domestic savings have remained relatively constant. One possible
explanation for this is a drastic increase in consumption via credit. Thus it is clear that
households are consuming outside of their means.
This explanation is related to the aforementioned housing bubble: families were
purchasing goods that they could not necessarily afford because there were innovations with
regards to mortgaging that allowed them to do so. Similarly, expansion of credit card use has
also been a factor that has allowed for consumers to increase spending at a faster rate than their
increase in income.
We have built a neo-Kaleckian model of growth that inherently contains a model of
consumption that was proposed by Setterfield, Mei, and Kim (Forthcoming A). We have
identified aspects of the growth in debt in order to identify if the concurrent economic growth is
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stable. If we can identify it to be unstable it could prove to be detrimental to the economy. If we
identify unsustainable debt, it would be in the best interest of consumers to adopt new debt
accumulation and servicing habits.
While we have discovered that the consumption model we use does not provide unstable
growth and/or unsustainable debt, it is important to note that the results Setterfield and Kim
(Forthcoming B) find are the opposite, as they use a slightly different model for consumption and
debt servicing. This would suggest that further research is necessary and recommended with
regards to identifying a possible threshold for the proportion of households that service their
debts in the way proposed in this thesis, versus the proportion that service their debts in the
manner described by Setterfield and Kim. This threshold could be used to describe the maximum
proportion of households that service their debt the way Setterfield and Kim suggest in order for
the growth to remain stable and the debt sustainable.
This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 is a literature review that
addresses issues of income inequality and household debt. Chapter 3 is the construction of the
growth and consumption models that we use. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the debt dynamics of the
model through a numerical analysis. Chapter 5 is the conclusion. All necessary appendices
follow the conclusion.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 The Increase in Income Inequality
There has been a long-standing debate on the significance of the distribution of income in
the economy. Many mainstream economists have often argued that redistribution towards profits
tends to stimulate saving, and hence investment and hence growth. However, Wisman (2009),
among others, argues that while the distribution of income has become more unequal since the
1970s, we have seen a decrease in aggregate savings.
The Proposed Benefits of Increased Income Inequality
The majority of thinkers argue that income inequality is not only important, but essential
in order to help a society prosper. Adam Smith, widely considered the father of modern
economics, is an important reason behind why this thinking exists. Smith developed a classical
based economy, which argued for Laissez-faire tactics. This passive approach to economics
convinced many thinkers that the best way for the economy to run was with as little assistance as
possible, and this includes adjusting the distribution of income (Smith 2011 p. 11).
One of the oldest justifications for inequality is the trickle down thesis. This is the idea
that savings is automatically equal to investment, which means that if income is redistributed
away from profits, it is less likely to be saved and hence invested. This supports the notion that
the economy will not grow as fast with a redistribution of income away from profits. We will
later argue that savings and investment being equal is not a given, but a necessary condition in
order to achieve equilibrium.
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As time has gone on, various other theories and explanations have been formed to explain
the necessity of income inequality. One of these is the idea that people have a right to keep what
they have earned. For example, someone who has earned $3 million in a given year feels that
they should not have to give some of that to someone who has earned $3,000. The former feels
that he has earned his income through hard work, and that by right it is theirs.
Many economists and others have argued over time that income inequality is essential for
a prospering economy, as it promotes competition. Throughout time, the mainstream view has
been that income inequality is essential in order for an economy to succeed (Smith 2011).
However, the combination of an increase in inequality with increased consumption can no doubt
be harmful to the economy.
The Proposed Downsides of Increased Income Inequality
Wisman points out the since the 1970s, we have seen the poorest 20% of Americans’
incomes decrease from 5.5% of national income to a mere 4% (p 104, 2009). The same decline
in the share of income is shown for the middle 40%, while, in contrast, the most affluent 5% of
the nation has seen their income rise from 15.5% to 21.1% of GDP. In addition, he notes that the
saving rate for the US has decreased from just over 10% in the early 1980s, to less than 0% (1.0%) in 2006 (p 90). These results lead to a rejection of the notion that greater disparities in
income distribution leads to greater savings/investment.
As Wisman later points out, “wage stagnation and greater inequality created consumption
externalities, requiring households to find ways both to meet family needs and to maintain their
relative status” (2013, 922). While income inequality has become severe, a growth in wealth
inequality is also apparent. Wisman indicates this evidence by noting that mean wealth has
grown twice as fast as median wealth in the economy (2013, 923). A growth in wealth and
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income inequality throughout the economy would theoretically suppress consumption in the
economy. Based on Keynes’ theory that consumption increases with income at a decreasing rate,
we would expect that as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, net consumption will fall,
namely that the propensity to consume decreases as income increases. This is contrary to the
evidence, which we will further investigate later as well.
There are certainly reasons behind the fact that the growth in inequality has been
overlooked as a problematic area of the economy. As Palley (2002) points out, the growth in
public as well as private debt has caused robust, demand-led growth, which has overshadowed
the problems with distribution. In addition, he points out the growth in debt in the household
sector, and how financial innovations have allowed for consumption to increase for those
households whose relative incomes have decreased.
As I have noted, the growth in income distribution is potentially problematic for the
economy. However, it is one of the many rungs on the ladder of the economy that I will outline.
We will in turn see how this growth in inequality has helped lead to an increase in household
debt accumulation and consumption. We will then see how these two factors simultaneously
affect economic growth.

2.2 The Increase in Demand for Credit

Changes In Consumption Behavior
Consumption has always played a prominent role in the macroeconomy. Consumers as a
whole are an important component in both the determination of national income, and in
economic growth. Prior to the 1970s, consumption accounted for anywhere between 84% and
88% of an individual’s personal disposable income (see Figure 2 below). While this ratio
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increased steadily, in the 1970s there was an outburst of consumption relative to income. Over
the past 40 years or so, namely from 1970-2012 the share of consumption out of personal
disposable income has increased from just over 84% to well over 90%, again shown in Figure 2
(Data supporting this information is included in Appendix A). That increase represents an
average annual increase of 1.8% per year. In contrast, the prior 23 years represents an annual
increase of only 0.29%.
Figure 2: Personal Consumption Expenditure as a Ratio to Disposable Income
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Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2; A067RX1A020NBEA, PCEC

Figure 1, shown above, showcases this information. Prior to 1970, households were
decreasing their propensity to consume, although not by much. However, from the mid 1970s on,
we see that the propensity to consume is increasing, as consumers are spending more and more
relative to the increase in their income.
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In addition, consumption now makes up a significantly larger portion of our national
income then it once did. From the late 1940s to around the mid 1970s, consumption as a
percentage of GDP hovered around 60%. However, since that time, we can clearly see that
consumption has taken up a greater portion of our national income, as it now accounts for nearly
70% of GDP. Figure 3 below shows this increase in consumption as a percentage of GDP.

Figure 3: Personal Consumption Expenditures as a Ratio to GDP
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Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCA/downloaddata?cid=106

Most theorists would assume that accompanying such a drastic increase in consumption
relative to disposable income would be a drastic reduction in savings. However, the data suggests
otherwise. While we have seen a reduction in savings out of income, the reduction has been very
slight, as shown in figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: Personal Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Income
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Data Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/A072RC1Q156SBEA/downloaddata?cid=110

The figure above clearly shows that up until the 1970s, the United States saw a slow but
steady increase in the propensity to save, while following 1970, the propensity to save has
decreased. However, this decrease has not been drastic, with the range over the 65 year period
going from a low of around 3% to a high of only about 13%. While it is safe to say that
Americans have changed their saving behavior in favor of a less cautious attitude, it is also fair to
note that this decrease in saving has been accompanied by the aforementioned increase in
consumption.
While this increase in consumption is explained by some essential consumption “goods”
such as health care and education (Wisman, 2013, p 930), we also notice a change in
consumption of luxury goods. The most explanatory reason behind this increase in consumption
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relative to income is the more widespread implementation of consumer credit, and debt financed
consumption. It is logical to conclude that the remainder of income not being saved or consumed
is being used to service the debts that have been accumulated by households. There have been
many innovations over the past 40 years or so, which have allowed for a robust increase in
household debt. These will be outlined in a later section. It is important to note why this
increased demand for credit has taken place. This can be largely attributed to changes in the
social nature of consumption.
Social Nature of Consumption
Preferences for consumption have evolved over time. The evidence that consumers are
spending more out of income points to this fact in convincing fashion. Despite the growth in the
inequality of the distribution of income discussed above, we have seen lower income households
attempting to maintain a level of consumption comparable to that of their more affluent
counterparts. One of the difficulties in social sciences is identifying the underlying reasons
behind changes in behavior. In economics, this issue is no different. There are many reasons for
a possible change in consumption preferences, and an increase in the propensity to consume. I
will address these reasons below.
Sociologists and economists alike have discussed the social nature of consumption. The
concept of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ is one that factors into this theory. Robert Frank
discussed the implications of this topic in his book Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior
and the Quest for Status. An example Frank outlines to illustrate this point has to do with
children drinking juice. He talks about how pouring a glass of juice for two children yields no
complaints, but if you pour a taller glass for one of the children, the one with less will complain
about not receiving an equal amount. The same is true for consumers. If we give two people
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$100, neither one is likely to complain, assuming there are no externalities in effect. But if we
give one of these consumers $150, and the other one gets $200, the one who received less will
not be happy, regardless of the fact that he still has more than he originally would have.
This problem is heavily prevalent in the United States because of the wide disparity in
disposable income. Although the lowest class of consumers still has more than many people in
third world countries, they see more affluent citizens with higher income and attempt to mimic
the behavior of these families.
The Relative Income Hypothesis
The relative income hypothesis refers to the idea that a person’s consumption and saving
behavior is not just a function of his or her current income, but rather of his income relative to
what it once was, what it is expected to be in the future, and what others around him are earning.
Outlined by James Duesenberry in his book Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer
Behavior in 1949, the relative income hypothesis argues that consumption choices are made
based on conscious decisions by consumers based on their observations of other households.
Duesenberry writes:
For any particular family, the frequency of contact with superior goods will increase
primarily as the consumption expenditures of others increase. When that occurs, impulses
to increase expenditure will increase in frequency, and strength and resistance to them
will be inadequate (p. 27).
Duesenberry continues this argument with a discussion of the social significance of
consumption. He says that a goal of society is to improve our standard of living, and one way of
achieving this is by consuming nicer goods. As a result, when one person obtains a nicer good, it
becomes embedded in societies mind that they should consume the same higher quality product.
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He uses this as an explanation behind why we often see consumption increase in households
faster relative to income. Robert Frank took this idea and ran with it with his discussion of
reference groups.
Reference Groups
Frank discusses the concept of reference groups in Choosing the Right Pond. These
reference groups refer to groups that individuals are able to compare themselves to in
sociological settings. He writes:
Sociophysiological experiments have demonstrated, for example, that specific
measures of autonomic nervous system arousal are strongly influenced by status
in social interactions (p. 23)
The point Frank is attempting to convey is that it is human nature for people to compare
themselves to those surrounding them. The phrase ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ is directly
relevant to this topic. Many people base their decisions on those of the people close to them. If
one person gets a new car, their neighbor is often likely to make a similar expenditure just to be
viewed in a comparable light, financially.
Frank is not the only person to make note of these reference groups. Cynamon and
Fazzari (2008) discuss these groups in detail and make the connection to economics by referring
to positional externalities. The point that they make is that if you observe two families of similar
income, one that is secluded and one that exists in a neighborhood with other high-end
consumers, the secluded family is likely to spend less of their income because they do not have
the reference groups to base their decisions off of. Below are two examples of how externalities
can affect a consumer’s reference groups.
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i. Mass Media Effect
As Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) point out, consumers are influenced by the role that the
media plays in influencing consumers. Most advertising and marketing campaigns are designed
to target those with enough disposable income to purchase the product. For example, imagine a
commercial for the iPhone. The Apple smart phones are marketed at anywhere from $200-$600.
This means firms are targeting consumers who have an excess of income of this amount. But
how does the person who is unable to afford the phone react to the advertisement?
Most people, regardless of whether they can afford the more expensive product or not,
feel the need to maintain a level of consumption comparable to that which the media dictates is
necessary. It is human nature to want to feel equal, and the media is able to generate feelings of
inferiority for those who do not own these luxury goods. Technology advances in recent history
is a perfect example of this effect. Laptops and smartphones were at one point a luxury good, but
they have become so heavily advertised that they are now virtually a necessity.
ii. Two-Earner Effect
The two-earner effect pertains to households in which both adults have jobs. This effect
is relevant more to the households that do not have two incomes but are in contact with families
that do. Consider a situation where there are two neighboring families. One of these families
consists of two parents with jobs, while the other one has a stay-at-home parent and a working
parent. The two-earner family is likely to have a higher net income and is more likely to
consume more. However, they factor into the reference group of the single-earner family. The
single-earner family sees the increase in consumption of the two-earner household and is likely
to attempt to mimic this behavior. This could potentially lead to consuming outside of their
means. As Cynamon and Fazzari point out:
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As the neighbors next door, the couple’s siblings, or the families of the employed
spouse’s co-workers move toward two earners in their households, the pressure on
the single-earner family rises, likely driving the desired consumption up faster
than income (pp. 11-12)
The importance of these reference groups is clearly evident in this example. If there is a singleearner household living in a community comprised almost exclusively of other single-earner
households, we will not see this effect. However, because the abundance of two-earner
households has increased, this has become an increasingly more relevant factor in explaining the
drastic increase in consumption.

One of the biggest problems with these causes of increased consumption pertains to the
idea of consumption through habit formation. Take the two-earner effect described above. A
household with two employed adults is more likely to consume more. However, let’s say one of
the earners of the family loses his or her job. This would substantially decrease the income of
said family, however, more often than not, the family would attempt to maintain certain
consumption standards because they have grown accustomed to a certain level. This habit
formation is fueled by some of the social aspects outlined above. People feel like they need to
consume what is dictated to them by various media outlets or their reference groups.
The concept of keeping up with the Joneses has been around for over half a century. It is
no secret that those who cannot afford as much as their more affluent neighbors struggle to
maintain a level of consumption that causes them to appear equally successful financially. The
materialism in our society is a driving force behind this effect. However, while we have now
discussed some causes of why consumers feel the need to make purchases beyond their means,
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we must now identify what financial regulations have allowed for this increased consumption to
occur.
Materialism and the Effect on Debt
Materialism in the United States is prevalent in day-to-day life. Name brand clothing,
popular smart phones, and other luxury goods are becoming normal goods as time goes on. Even
many families that have a lower household income are purchasing products that are outside of
their price range as noted above. In a study of materialism and debt, Watson (2003) notes that
those with high levels of materialism are more likely to spend more. Watson then points out that
these same households are likely to have more relaxed feelings towards taking on increasing
amounts of debt. A number of other hypotheses were tested concerning the materialistic nature
of certain households and the likelihood of these households in taking on various types of debt:
People with high levels of materialism (in comparison to people with low levels of
materialism) are more likely to exhibit behaviors consistent with positive attitudes toward
debt – use of installment credit and outstanding debt. (Watson 735).
In an increasingly materialistic society, Watson shows that the prospect of debt becoming a
problem among households is not only a possibility, but a probability.
This notion is supported in an empirical study by Brown et. al. (2013). In this paper, the
authors note that households are far more likely to accept the risk of debt accumulation,
especially lower income households:
The risk attitudes measure is found to have a larger impact at the bottom end of the debt
distribution, i.e. the influence of risk attitudes diminishes as the debt burden of the
household increases (Brown et. al 299).
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Tying these two studies together, it is clear that lower income households are more likely to
accept risk, and thus more likely to accumulate debt.
It seems evident that households are in fact increasing their materialism in the United
States. The consumption evidence outlined above supports this notion. Because of this increasing
desire for luxury goods, households are more likely to attempt to accumulate debt. However,
purchasing on credit is not a one-way street. While increased materialism certainly explains why
households want (so to speak) to increase their debt, in order for this to take place, there must be
creditors that are willing to satisfy this increase.

2.3 The Increase in Supply of Credit

Availability of Credit
In order for debt to actually be accumulated, creditors must make this debt available to
common households. Households must be able to purchase on credit in order for debt to actually
increase. Cynamon and Fazzari make a note in their paper about this increase in availability of
debt: “Between 1970 and 1998, [credit] card ownership in the lowest income quintile went from
2 percent to over 25 percent, and the highest quintile went from 33 percent to 95 percent”
(Cynamon and Fazzari 2008 15). Not only were borrowers requesting more and more credit, but
lenders were clearly facilitating this increase by granting more credit applications. This two-way
relationship has allowed for household debt to increase to staggering levels, which could prove
to be detrimental to the economy.
Figure 5 (shown below) shows the amount of loans that were granted on a monthly basis
over the past half-century or so. It is clear from looking at the graph that more and more credit
requests were being granted up until the Great Recession. This supports the notion that creditors
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were becoming more and more lenient with their credit applications and hence contributed to the
accumulation of household debt.
Figure 5: Number of Loans on Bank Credit
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As a result of the increase in consumption relative to income, consumers have responded
not simply by decreasing the propensity to save, but by increasing the amount of consumption
that is financed by debt. Consumer debt has become increasingly more utilized over the past 40
years or so. Financial innovations, mortgaging options and wider availability of credit are some
of the driving factors behind this increase in debt. The real issue lies when we look at the
relationship between aggregate household debt and national income. As shown in Figure 6, the
debt to income ratio has increased substantially over the last 40 years. While in the 1940s, 50s
and 60s, consumers maintained a relatively constant debt to income ratio, we can see that as the
availability of consumer credit exploded in the 1970s and 80s, the ratio of outstanding household
debt to disposable income exploded as well. We will go into the underlying implications of this
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problem in a later section. For now, we will investigate some of the causes of this increase in the
willingness to supply debt.
The distribution of income is an important contributor to the explosion of debt relative to
income. As noted in the previous section, many families attempt to emulate more affluent
families in an effort to seem of a higher social class. This emulation effect often leads to families
consuming beyond their means. Due to changes in availability of personal financing, many
people are able to use credit and other debt accumulation techniques for financing these
consumption expenditures.
Changes in Household Mortgaging
Mortgage financing options also played a major role in allowing for an increased level of
household debt. The introduction of cash-out financing allowed for households to purchase
houses that were out of their price range, based on the assumption that housing prices would
continue to rise and they could remortgage the house a few months down the line, before the
payments became too steep. While again, this was partly the result of consumers attempting to
take on a greater debt then they could afford, banks contributed to this issue as well by willingly
supplying the necessary loans.
However, the problem lies in the use of these loans. Banks were allowing households to
borrow against the equity they already owned on their houses in order to finance consumption
goods. For example, now instead of refinancing the house for living purposes, households were
borrowing money to finance vacations or pay for holiday gifts. This method of debt
accumulation can clearly be attributed to lack of due diligence on the part of the creditors.
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Increased Use of Credit Cards
The use of credit cards has also helped households to accumulate debt. By allowing
consumers to make purchases on credit, consumers have become more comfortable accumulating
debt for the benefit of their consumption practices. Credit card companies have been willing to
oblige this increased demand for credit cards. As noted earlier, we have seen a drastic increase in
the use of credit cards in recent decades. This phenomenon has occurred, not just because more
people are applying for credit cards, but because credit card companies are, as rational firms,
more and more willing to supply these cards.
If banks are allowing for more and more debt to build up, the risk of mass default was
clearly becoming more and more likely. It was not a coincidence that so many households were
unable to service these debts, but in reality, it was a product of the financial sector taking on the
risk as well.
Figure 6 below shows the largest underlying issue that lies within this increase in debt.
The debt:income ratio in the United States has increased to the point that it was well over 1 prior
to the start of the Great Recession. This is one of the most important motivating statistics behind
this thesis, and something we will analyze in greater detail later.
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Figure 6: Outstanding Household Debt to Disposable Income Ratio
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3 Theoretical Model
3.1 Neo-Kaleckian Growth Model
In this thesis, we use a Neo-Kaleckian growth model as the basis for investigating growth
and debt dynamics. Neo-Kaleckian growth economists are followers of the Post-Keynesian
growth school. Specifically, the model is built off of Joan Robinson’s contributions to the field
(Lavoie 1992). In Robinson’s theory there are two vital equations: the determination of the rate
of profit and the determination of the rate of accumulation. Her rate of profit equation is
consistent with the equilibrium assumption that investment is equal to savings, and hence can be
expressed as follows:

I=S
S = sπ Π
1
I
sπ
Π 1 I
=
K sπ K
1
r= g
sπ

⇒Π=

Where r is the rate of profit, sπ is the propensity to save out of profits, and g is the actual

€ accumulation rate. It is useful to note that this is essentially the same as Karl Marx’s equation for
growth (g = sπr). The only difference is that here, the direction of causality is different, as
Robinson argues that growth is demand led, in the typical Keynesian fashion. We can think of
Robinson’s model being written as:

g s = sπ r
for simplicity, making gs the required accumulation behavior that is necessary under the

€ conditions I = S. This same assumption and derivation holds in the neo-Kaleckian model.
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The second important equation that Robinson uses is the determination of the rate of
accumulation. Robinson argues that the utilization rate is constant in the long run (for simplicity
u = 1). Robinson’s desired accumulation is thus g = g(r), namely the expected rate of profit
determines the amount of accumulation. Here is where Neo-Kaleckians differ in their
determination of growth. We assume that the utilization rate of capacity is variable, making
g*=g*(π,u), or equivalently (according to Stockhammer (1999)):

gk = γ 0 + γ1r
Note, that here, γ0 is a parameter that is used to measure the state of confidence of investors,

€ while γ1 is a parameter that measures how sensitive the desired rate of accumulation is to the
actual profit rate.
In order to complete the model, we must determine a representation of the rate of
capacity, as it is variable. Traditionally, u is defined as

u=

Ku
K

namely, the amount of capital that is being used expressed as a ratio to the amount of total

€ capital. However, we will assume a fixed coefficient production function such that:
Y = min{K v , L v }
1
2

In this fashion, the capital:output ratio is defined as constant, and equal to v1 and the labor:output
€ ratio is v2. Thus, we can think of Y/Ku as a constant as well, which leads us to create our formula

for u, where:

u=

Y Ku Y
*
=
Ku K K

€
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We can move forward and recognize that the profit rate (defined as r = ∏/K) is equal to
the capacity utilization rate times the profit share (π = ∏/Y), so that we can express the rate of
profit as

r = πu
which gives us a final expression for our rate of accumulation in terms of our capacity utilization

€ rate:
gk = γ 0 + γ1πu
A diagram depicting this model is included in Appendix 2.

€

It is important to note that in the basic model format, a stable equilibrium exists if we
make some underlying assumptions. The first of which, is that our intercept for gk, namely γ0, is
positive. In addition to this, we need the slope of the gk schedule to be shallower than the slope
of the gs schedule (sπ > γ1π). If both of these conditions hold, we have a stable equilibrium.
This equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the gk and gs schedule. If this is the
case then we have:

g s = gk
sπ r = γ 0 + γ1πr
γ0
r* =
sπ − γ1π
sγ
⇒ g* = π 0
sπ − γ1π
v r*
⇒ u* = r
π
The above values for r*, g*, and u* are the equilibrium values for our three variables. It may also

€ be useful to note some comparative statics in this relationship. For u, when sπ increases, u,
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decreases, because an increase in sπ negatively affects our rate of profit, which will decrease the
utilization rate. Similarly, if the profit share increases, the utilization rate also decreases.
These derivatives are spelled out below.

dr *
−γ 0
=
dsπ (sπ − γ1π ) 2
du * v r
−γ 0
⇒
= *
<0
dsπ
π (sπ − γ1π ) 2
du *
v r*
=− r 2 <0
dπ
π
3.2 Aggregate Consumption Theory

€
In the manner proposed by Kim et. al (forthcoming A), there are essentially two methods
in which households consume, save, and service their debts out of their incomes. As has been
previously indicated, houses have been borrowing at an increasing speed over the last few
decades, so we can no longer think of consumption as being a function solely of wealth, income,
or wages. Now that debt accumulation has become a factor, the idea of household borrowing
must be interpreted as a facilitator of consumption.
The interesting issue here lies in how households service their debts. If households
borrow without being able to repay their loans, there is a strong possibility of default on those
loans, which, as Minsky (1978) notes, could result in financial fragility. This is exactly what
seems to have occurred in 2008, as banks were giving out mortgages to families that were unable
to service their debts and hence resulted in the loss of numerous houses as well as a credit
crunch, as identified by Setterfield and Fontana (2009). It is important to note, that we use the
term debt servicing to refer to repaying the interest on loans at a bare minimum.
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However, households do not merely consume and service their debts, taking up the
entirety of their disposable income. In a Keynesian world with an uncertain future, rational
consumers will save a proportion of their income in order to assist their family during future
trials and tribulations. In addition, we assume that all households are homogeneous to their
specific groups, which I will outline below.
The growth in the distribution of income is evidence to not just a disparity between the
capitalists (profit earners) of the US and everyone else. We are actually able to distinguish
between 3 groups of households: production workers, supervisor/managerial workers, and
capitalists. For our purposes, we will assume that debt servicing is exclusively an issue with
production workers. Capitalists often do not even take on debt, as they are primarily the ones
providing the loans, and we assume (and reasonably so) that supervisor workers are able to
service their debts without issue (if and when they do take on debt). Thus, we concern ourselves
with two types of consumption households: workers and rentiers. Working households refer to
production workers and make up about the bottom 80% of the income distribution (as noted by
Palley 2013). Rentier households are the remaining houses, composed of managerial workers and
capitalists.
In order for our model to be theoretically accurate as well as plausible, there are certain
assumptions we will make. First, we make the assumption that the propensity to consume for
production workers is greater than that of rentiers. In addition, we will assume that all working
households and only these households finance part of their consumption through borrowing,
while rentier households do not. In addition, we have made the assumption that due to
uncertainty within the financial markets, it is only natural for working households to save in
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accordance with their debt accumulation and consumption so as to protect themselves against
unforeseen financial struggles.
Our model for consumption is as follows:
•

C = CW + CR + D
Here, D-dot refers to the accumulation of debt. As noted in a previous section, households’
consumption
behaviors are influenced by consumption behaviors of their reference groups.
€
Specifically, more often than not, production workers attempt to mimic the consumption
behaviors from rentier households, as these households represent a greater level of financial
success. Thus, D-dot can be expressed in this form:
•

D = β(C T − CW )
where CT refers to some target level of consumers wish to emulate based on the factors outlined
above
€ such as reference groups. In addition, we will assume that production workers naturally
wish to target a level of consumption that is comparable to that of the rentiers, namely that:

C T = ηCR 0 < η ≤ 1
Essentially, the way working households operate is in this manner: they observe the consumption

€
behavior
they choose a target level of consumption that is based on this and is
€ of the rentiers,
greater than their consumption, they accumulate debt based on bank loans, credit cards, etc. and
they consume after the fact.
Kim et. al theorize that the debts that production workers accumulate will be serviced in
one of two ways. The first concerns the type of household that is more materialistic, and thus
consumption is of a greater priority. This type of household takes their disposable income, and
consumes a portion of it based on their propensity to consume, cW. From whatever is left over,
the household will choose to save a proportion of their income, or to service their debts from it.
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Kim and Setterfield have written a paper describing the stability and sustainability affects of this
method of debt servicing behavior in which there is a stable, equilibrium value of growth, but the
debt:capital ratio that is consistent with equilibrium is unsustainable (Kim, forthcoming B).
For our purposes, we will assume the validity of a second type of consumption behavior,
namely that production workers service their debts before deciding whether to consume or save.
This is the more conventional approach, where households shave off a portion of their income to
service their debts, before they practice saving and consumption behaviors. An equation
representing the consumption of production workers can be expressed as follows:

CW = cW (W PϕN − iDR )
Here, WP is the wages of production workers, φ is the proportion of workers that are production
workers versus supervisory workers, and N is the level of employment. This means that WPφN is

€

the aggregate income of production workers in the economy. DR is equivalent to the debt
accumulated by workers, which is equal to the loans received by workers, with the removal of
deposits made, with i being the interest rate.
In addition, we can derive from this an expression for the consumption of rentiers, which,
as a reminder are composed of supervisory workers and capitalists, who, for simplicity, we will
assume consume equal proportions of their income:

CR = cπ (W R (1 − ϕ)N + Π + iDR )
where ∏ is total profits in the economy. Notice also that we have WR(1-φ)N equal to the
aggregate income of managerial workers. Thus, we can build a model for aggregate consumption

€

as follows, by substituting the previous equations into the consumption equation, we get the
following.
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C = (1 − β)cW (W PϕN − iDR )
+(1+ βη)cπ (W R (1 − ϕ)N + Π + iDR )
The derivation of this consumption model is shown in Appendix 2.

3.3€Growth Model with Consumption Built In
We can create a temporary equilibrium such that:

Y = CW + CR + D˙ + I
where, in the absence of an external sector and a public sector, we can think of this as the goods

€ clearing conditions. Based on our determinations for consumption out of wages, by
market
rentiers, debt accumulation and investment, we can substitute in and create an expression for Y
where:

Y = (1 − β)cW (W PϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (W R (1 − ϕ)N + Π + iDR ) + I
If we normalize, by K, we can obtain an expression for the utilization rate of capacity,

€
where:
u=

(1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )

This allows us to express the rate of profit and accumulation as well:

€

π[(1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0 ]
(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )
γ 1π[(1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0 ]
gk = γ 0 +
(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )
r=

€
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3.4 Comparative Statics
Based on our calculations, we can create a table that shows the effects on our equilibrium
growth rate, rate of profit and rate of utilization of changes in some of our variables. Table 1
shows these changes:
Table 1:
Variables
γ0
u
+
r
+
gk
+

π
?
?
?

i
?
?
?

dR
?
?
?

η
+
+
+

With the exception of our intercept term, which is a confidence variable that is determined by
what Keynes referred to as the animal spirits of investors, and our η variable, which accounts for
our emulation parameter, all of our variables have an ambiguous effect on any of our three
equilibrium outcomes.
It makes sense that our partial derivatives with respect to η are unambiguously positive. If
working households attempt to emulate a higher proportion of consumption among rentier
households, then more debt will be accumulated, so consumption will increase as well, spurring
economic growth.
The ambiguity of our partial derivatives with respect to the other three independent
variables is useful to analyze as well. With an increase in the profit share, the directional change
of u, r, and gk is not made clear based on my calculations and assumptions. The same holds true
with a change in the interest rate or the debt:capital ratio. However, in the next section we will
investigate how these variables may change when we use plausibly hypothesized parameters for
our independent variables.
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4 Debt Dynamics
4.1 Calculation of dR
Finally, we will address the issue of stability of growth and sustainability of consumer
debt. Based on how we defined dR, we can identify an expression for the rate of change of dR as
follows:
T
˙
˙d = β(C − Cw ) − Dw − g d
R
k R
K
d˙ R = β(ηCR /K − Cw /K) − D˙ w /K − gk dR
d˙ R = βηcπ (ω r u + πu + idR ) − (1+ βc w − c w )(ω p u − idR ) − gk dR

By substituting the previously obtained expressions for u and gk, we can identify an expression
for €
̇dR. Once we have this expression, we can identify steady state values of dR by setting d•R = 0.
We will investigate this further in the numerical analysis.
Because a change in dR results in an ambiguous change in gk, we will need to analyze the
equilibrium values further with a numerical analysis (addressed later). However, obtaining an
expression such as the one shown above allows us to determine the equilibrium values of the
debt:capital ratio. When the rate of change of dR is 0, we would be at equilibrium and the
stability of this equilibrium is determined by the shape of the d˙ R curve. Because our equation for
gk is as follows:

gk = γ 0 +

€ βη)c id + γ ]
γ1π[(1 − β)cW idR + (1+
π R
0
(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ1π )

We can see that there are two values of dR in the numerator. Thus, when we multiply gk by dR as

€ in the expression for the rate of change of dR, we would end up with a quadratic equation.
shown
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It is therefore important to identify parameter values so that we can determine the concavity of
the resulting parabola.
Although the concavity of our expression for d˙ R is not yet determined, we can see that it
is clearly a quadratic, as multiplying dR by gk gives us a product of two dR terms (discussed
above). This is important because it means €
that, assuming there are two x-intercepts for the
parabola, there are two equilibrium values for the rate of change of dR. One of these is the stable
equilibrium namely, temporary disequilibrium simply results in a movement along the curve
back towards the stable value. The other equilibrium is unstable, meaning that the same
disequilibrium will result in further diversion from equilibrium. Thus, once we determine the
stable and unstable equilibrium values, we can identify whether stability and sustainability is
achieved by looking at the maximum feasible level of debt relative to the value associated with
equilibrium.
We define this maximum level of debt as the largest value of the debt:capital ratio that is
sustainable based on the theory of consumption that we have been implementing. By assuming
that households place a first priority on servicing their debts, it is clear that

iDR max − W p N = 0
where DRmax represents the maximum amount of debt that households could take on while still
being
€ able to service these debts. It follows from this that:

dR max =

ω pu
i

If the value of dRmax lies above the stable equilibrium value, then we can determine that the debt
is sustainable in equilibrium.

€
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4.2 Numerical Analysis
In order to develop an expression for d˙ R as a function of dR, we must identify plausible
values for all of our other parameters. Information showing what these values are as well as

€ Table 2. It is important to note that many of these values are
where they come from is included in
based on previous studies and real world data, while others are more arbitrary. For example, the
value γ0, a measurement of the level of confidence, is almost purely speculative. It is important
to note that the value of γ0 has been calibrated around the expectation that firms attempt to
achieve a utilization rate of around 80%, given the values of all other parameters shown below.
This was done because 80% is the average rate of capacity utilization in the US economy over
the last several decades.
Table 3: Parameter Values
Neo-Liberal
Source
Parameters
γ0
0.095
Authors’ Calculations1
γ1
0.5
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002)
cW
0.94
Authors’ Calculations Based on
Bunting (1998)
β
0.1
Authors’ Calculations2
i
0.481
Authors’ Calculations based on
World Bank Data3
π
0.34
Authors’ Calculations4
η
21.7181
Authors’ Calculations5
cπ
0.2
Setterfield and Budd (2011)
ωp
0.42
Authors’ Calculations based on
Mohun (2006)
Φ
0.567
Authors’ Calculations6
1
: Set in accordance with other parameters in order to yield a capacity utilization rate of around
0.8
2
: Set in accordance with other parameters in order to satisfy the Keynesian stability condition
3
: See data.worldbank.org
4
: Set in accordance with π=1-(1+Φ)ωp
5
: Calculated based on η = δλ, where λ is an emulation parameter (Ravina 2007) and δ is a
scaling parameter based on Mishel and Sabadish (2012)
6
: Calculated based on Φ = αφ
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The distributional parameters are based in correspondence with a Neoliberal growth
regime. Many Keynesian economists identify the Neoliberal growth parameters as a consequence
of income distribution: “Between 1973 and 2006, the average annual real income of the bottom
90 percent of households fell while that of the top 1 percent increased 3.2 fold” (Kim
Forthcoming B p. 20). This growth in the distribution of income is captured by the parameters
from row 1 in Table 4.
Evaluating our d˙ R function with these parameter values gives us the result that gk
decreases with an increase in dR. Evaluating and simplifying the expression gives us:

€
d˙ R = 0.16439 − 0.234134dR + 0.016054dR 2
A graph illustrating this equation is shown below in Figure 8. Using Mathematica, we are able to

€ identify the stable and unstable equilibrium points by the x intercepts1. Our x-intercepts in the
graph are points of interest for our purposes. As figure 8 expresses the rate of change of the
debt:capital ratio as a function of the debt:capital ratio itself, we can see that when the graph is
negative, the rate of change is negative which results in a leftwards movement along the x-axis.
Similarly, if the graph is positive, we will move to the right along the x-axis as the rate of change
is now positive. We will refer to the stable equilibrium, the left-most x-intercept, as dR1. We
know that this is the stable steady state because if we revert a little outside of equilibrium, the
force of the rate of change will pull us towards it. In contrast, dR2 is also an equilibrium value,
but it is unstable.
For example, consider a situation where we start at a value of dR such that dR < dR1. It is
clear that d˙ R > 0, so dR will have a positive rate of change, meaning as time goes on, dR will
increase and move towards dR1. Similarly, if we start at a point dR such that dR > dR1 we can see
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  Table 4 provides this information as well as identifying the changes that would occur under a
Golden Age distributional parameter set.	
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that d˙ R < 0, so dR will have a negative rate of change, meaning as time goes on, dR will decrease
and move towards dR1. It is because of this that we can identify dR1 as the stable equilibrium.

€

However, if we start at a value of dR such that dR > dR2, than d˙ R > 0. This will result in a
movement of dR further away from dR2 making it the unstable equilibrium.

€
Figure 8:

We have already noted that dR1 is the stable equilibrium and dR2 is unstable. Now we need
to examine the sustainability of consumer debt in equilibrium. We can do this by looking at our
calculations for the feasibility coefficent, c:

c = ω p u − idR1
If c is positive, it means that our value for dRmax is above the stable equilibrium value, dR1, which
means that the debt level at dR1 is sustainable. Calculations for c are also included in Table 4. We

€

can see that under the plausible, Neo-Liberal conditions, not only does the stable equilibrium
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exist (as evidenced by figure 8), but the level of debt that is concurrent with this equilibrium is
sustainable. We can see this in two ways. One, as mentioned is identifying the value of c, and
whether it is positive or not. The second method is by simply looking at the dR1 column of table 4
and making sure the dRmax column is a larger value. This leads to the assertion that while there
are certainly negative drawbacks to consumers accumulating mass amounts of debt, we can not
assert that it would be problematic for the economy based on the assumptions we have made.
It is useful to identify how changing the parameters to fit a golden age regime would
affect this result. A Golden Age regime is a term coined by Keyensian economist that captures
the growth of income prior to the 1970s, when all income grew at roughly the same rate (~3
percent) according to Kim (Forthcoming B). This phenomenon prevented income inequality
from increasing substantially. Golden Age distributional parameters are captured by row 2 of
Table 4.
Table 4: Change in Distribution: Golden Age and Neoliberal Regimes
ωr
ωp
π
η
dR1
dR2
dRmax
Neo-Liberal
0.24
0.42
0.34
21.72
0.7396
13.8446
7.08535
Golden Age
0.23
0.48
0.2896 2.92
-0.1044 9.6854
3.1055

c
0.305
0.1544

From the above table, we can see that regardless of the parameter make up, based on the
implemented theory of consumption and debt servicing our debt is sustainable in the steady state
equilibrium. Under both distributional regimes, our value for c is positive which supports this
notion. Interesting to note, however, is the fact that in Golden Age system, dR1 is negative
(shown in figure 9). Our equation for the rate of change of the debt:capital ratio as a function of
dR itself is shown below:

d˙ R = −0.01314 − 0.1246dR + 0.13dR 2

€
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The above equation gives us the stable equilibrium of dR = -0.1. This means that with a
redistribution of income, we would see working households change from net debtors to net
creditors.
Figure 9:

Although both situations described above support the same result (that being that a stable
equilibrium growth rate is obtainable and that the debt:capital ratio accompanying it is
sustainable), the results are based on the assumption that all households service their debts in
exactly the same way. As a result of this, the results in this thesis are different than those
obtained in Setterfield and Kim’s paper, where the debt servicing behavior is markedly different.
In this paper, we considered households that service their debts out of their disposable income
and then choose whether to consume or spend whatever is left over. In the preceding paper,
Setterfield and Kim discuss a situation where households consume first, and then delegate the
remaining disposable income towards saving and debt servicing.
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In Setterfield and Kim, the resulting parabola from the rate of change equation is concave
down, which means that the larger of the two intercepts is the stable equilibrium. It is because of
this important difference that the results differ between the two papers.
Further research could prove to be worthwhile, namely an investigation into what
proportion of those servicing their debts behave the way that Setterfield and Kim suggest, and
what proportion behave the way I have alluded to. Furthermore, it would be interesting to find
what threshold this proportion would need to cross in order for the results to change from
sustainable debt, to unsustainable.
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have investigated some reasons behind the growth in consumption and
household debt, specifically in the United States. We have taken a look at the growth in income
inequality and how that has helped fuel the desire among households to consume, and how
financial innovations have allowed for this consumption to be accomplished through debt
accumulation. We then constructed a theoretical model of growth and consumption and, through
a numerical analysis, have identified the stability of growth and sustainability of debt that results
from our assumptions.
From our results, we can see that while there is not unstable growth and unsustainable
debt, a redistribution of income would not cause a reversal effect. In fact, a redistribution that is
proposed with the golden age parameter set would actually result in working households
becoming net creditors instead of debtors. The model of debt servicing that we have used has
proven to not be detrimental to the growth of an economy using a neo-Kaleckian growth model.
However, these results are contradictory to those obtained by Setterfield and Kim (Forthcoming
B), which suggests additional research would be both beneficial and necessary. This research
could identify a threshold value for the proportion of households that service their debts one way
versus the proportion that service their debts the other way. However, all that we can say for
certain after this thesis is that identifying causes of the Great Recession is still up in the air, and
one that economists can look forward to tackling in the future.
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Appendix 1: Data
Personal Disposable Income, Consumption and Saving
DATE

PCE
1947-01-01
1948-01-01
1949-01-01
1950-01-01
1951-01-01
1952-01-01
1953-01-01
1954-01-01
1955-01-01
1956-01-01
1957-01-01
1958-01-01
1959-01-01
1960-01-01
1961-01-01
1962-01-01
1963-01-01
1964-01-01
1965-01-01
1966-01-01
1967-01-01
1968-01-01
1969-01-01
1970-01-01
1971-01-01
1972-01-01
1973-01-01
1974-01-01
1975-01-01
1976-01-01
1977-01-01
1978-01-01
1979-01-01
1980-01-01
1981-01-01
1982-01-01
1983-01-01
1984-01-01
1985-01-01
1986-01-01
1987-01-01
1988-01-01
1989-01-01
1990-01-01
1991-01-01
1992-01-01
1993-01-01
1994-01-01

	
  

PDI
162.0
175.0
178.5
192.2
208.5
219.5
233.0
239.9
258.7
271.6
286.7
296.0
317.5
331.6
342.0
363.1
382.5
411.2
443.6
480.6
507.4
557.4
604.5
647.7
701.0
769.4
851.1
932.0
1032.8
1150.2
1276.7
1426.2
1589.5
1754.6
1937.5
2073.9
2286.5
2498.2
2722.7
2898.4
3092.1
3346.9
3592.8
3825.6
3960.2
4215.7
4471.0
4741.0

174.8
194.5
194.5
215.0
237.4
250.7
266.3
272.4
291.7
311.8
329.6
340.9
360.9
376.5
393.8
417.5
438.3
476.3
513.2
554.2
592.8
643.8
695.8
761.5
830.4
899.9
1006.1
1098.3
1219.3
1325.8
1456.7
1630.1
1809.3
2018.0
2250.7
2424.7
2617.4
2903.9
3098.5
3287.9
3466.3
3770.4
4052.1
4311.8
4484.5
4800.3
5000.2
5244.2
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PCE:PDI
0.926773455
0.899742931
0.917737789
0.893953488
0.878264532
0.875548464
0.87495306
0.880690162
0.886870072
0.871071199
0.869842233
0.868289821
0.879745082
0.880743692
0.868461148
0.869700599
0.872689938
0.863321436
0.864380359
0.867195958
0.855937922
0.865796831
0.868784133
0.850558109
0.844171484
0.854983887
0.845939767
0.848584176
0.847043386
0.867551667
0.876433034
0.874915649
0.878516553
0.869474727
0.860843293
0.855322308
0.873576832
0.860291332
0.878715508
0.881535327
0.892046274
0.8876777
0.886651366
0.887239668
0.883086186
0.878215945
0.894164233
0.904046375

Saving
11.0
17.2
13.6
20.0
25.9
27.8
29.2
28.2
28.2
34.7
36.9
38.9
37.1
37.8
44.4
46.4
46.7
54.8
58.3
61.4
72.2
72.1
75.0
96.1
110.1
109.2
131.8
141.7
159.0
147.3
148.2
166.6
177.5
213.2
252.5
277.7
247.0
312.1
265.1
269.4
252.1
294.7
316.5
335.4
365.9
426.0
367.6
331.4

Saving:PDI
0.062929062
0.088431877
0.069922879
0.093023256
0.109098568
0.110889509
0.10965077
0.103524229
0.096674666
0.111289288
0.111953883
0.11410971
0.102798559
0.100398406
0.112747588
0.111137725
0.106548026
0.115053538
0.113600935
0.110790328
0.121794872
0.111991302
0.107789595
0.126198293
0.132586705
0.121346816
0.131000895
0.129017573
0.13040269
0.11110273
0.101736802
0.102202319
0.098104239
0.105649158
0.11218732
0.114529633
0.094368457
0.107476153
0.085557528
0.081936799
0.072728846
0.078161468
0.078107648
0.077786539
0.081592151
0.088744453
0.073517059
0.063193623

MPC+MPS
0.989702517
0.988174807
0.987660668
0.986976744
0.9873631
0.986437974
0.98460383
0.984214391
0.983544738
0.982360487
0.981796117
0.982399531
0.982543641
0.981142098
0.981208735
0.980838323
0.979237965
0.978374974
0.977981294
0.977986287
0.977732794
0.977788133
0.976573728
0.976756402
0.976758189
0.976330703
0.976940662
0.977601748
0.977446076
0.978654397
0.978169836
0.977117968
0.976620793
0.975123885
0.973030613
0.96985194
0.967945289
0.967767485
0.964273035
0.963472125
0.96477512
0.965839168
0.964759014
0.965026207
0.964678336
0.966960398
0.967681293
0.967239998

1995-01-01
1996-01-01
1997-01-01
1998-01-01
1999-01-01
2000-01-01
2001-01-01
2002-01-01
2003-01-01
2004-01-01
2005-01-01
2006-01-01
2007-01-01
2008-01-01
2009-01-01
2010-01-01
2011-01-01
2012-01-01
2013-01-01

4984.2
5268.1
5560.7
5903.0
6316.9
6801.6
7106.9
7385.3
7764.4
8257.8
8790.3
9297.5
9744.4
10005.5
9842.9
10201.9
10711.8
11149.6
11499.3

5532.6
5829.9
6148.9
6561.3
6876.3
7400.5
7752.3
8099.2
8486.7
9003.2
9401.8
10037.7
10507.9
10995.4
10937.2
11243.7
11787.4
12245.8
12474.2

0.90087843
0.903634711
0.904340614
0.899669273
0.91864811
0.919073036
0.916747288
0.911855492
0.914890358
0.917207215
0.934959263
0.926258007
0.927340382
0.909971443
0.89994697
0.907343668
0.908750021
0.910483594
0.921846692

352.9
345.2
352.2
405.3
293.0
297.9
331.2
403.9
410.8
413.2
242.7
336.9
317.2
551.3
670.7
634.2
668.2
687.4

0.063785562
0.059211993
0.057278538
0.061771295
0.042610125
0.040254037
0.042722805
0.049869123
0.048405152
0.045894793
0.025814206
0.033563466
0.030186812
0.050139149
0.061322825
0.05640492
0.05668765
0.056133531
0

National Income and Debt

Date
1947-01-01
1948-01-01
1949-01-01
1950-01-01
1951-01-01
1952-01-01
1953-01-01
1954-01-01
1955-01-01
1956-01-01
1957-01-01
1958-01-01
1959-01-01
1960-01-01
1961-01-01
1962-01-01
1963-01-01
1964-01-01
1965-01-01
1966-01-01
1967-01-01
1968-01-01
1969-01-01
1970-01-01
1971-01-01
1972-01-01
1973-01-01
1974-01-01

	
  

Outstanding
Debt
44.16
52.7
60.53
73.3
81.86
94.02
106.22
117.69
138.35
153.2
165.79
176.55
198.54
216.49
233.87
255.81
282.91
312.66
340.57
363.1
386.81
415.2
444.96
460.26
503.25
558.23
628.21
684.53

Debt:PDI
0.033635463
0.038127623
0.043443623
0.04816348
0.052030763
0.057758938
0.062229773
0.067973894
0.074925535
0.079181311
0.083525618
0.088015355
0.094899861
0.100838418
0.105218878
0.109832124
0.117074281
0.120806769
0.123893194
0.125423143
0.12805734
0.131500602
0.136306825
0.134839163
0.140950594
0.149207495
0.158295117
0.174460331

Real
GDP
1937.6
2018.0
2007.0
2181.9
2357.7
2453.7
2568.9
2554.4
2736.4
2794.7
2853.5
2832.6
3028.1
3105.8
3185.1
3379.9
3527.1
3730.5
3972.9
4234.9
4351.2
4564.7
4707.9
4717.7
4873.0
5128.8
5418.2
5390.2
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Consumption
as a
Percentage of
GDP
0.083608588
0.086719524
0.088938714
0.088088363
0.088433643
0.089456739
0.0907003
0.09391638
0.094540272
0.097183955
0.100473103
0.104497635
0.104851227
0.106767982
0.107374965
0.107429214
0.108446032
0.110226511
0.111656473
0.11348556
0.116611509
0.122132889
0.128401198
0.137291477
0.143853889
0.150015598
0.157100144
0.172906386

Debt:GDP
2.279108175
2.611496531
3.015944195
3.359457354
3.472027824
3.831764274
4.134843707
4.60734419
5.055912878
5.481804845
5.810057824
6.232789663
6.556586638
6.970506794
7.342626605
7.568567117
8.021037113
8.381182147
8.572327519
8.573992302
8.889731568
9.09588801
9.451347735
9.756025182
10.32731377
10.88422243
11.59444096
12.69952877

0.964663992
0.962846704
0.961619151
0.961440568
0.961258235
0.959327072
0.959470093
0.961724615
0.963295509
0.963102008
0.960773469
0.959821473
0.957527194
0.960110592
0.961269795
0.963748588
0.965437671
0.966617126

1975-01-01
1976-01-01
1977-01-01
1978-01-01
1979-01-01
1980-01-01
1981-01-01
1982-01-01
1983-01-01
1984-01-01
1985-01-01
1986-01-01
1987-01-01
1988-01-01
1989-01-01
1990-01-01
1991-01-01
1992-01-01
1993-01-01
1994-01-01
1995-01-01
1996-01-01
1997-01-01
1998-01-01
1999-01-01
2000-01-01
2001-01-01
2002-01-01
2003-01-01
2004-01-01
2005-01-01
2006-01-01
2007-01-01
2008-01-01
2009-01-01
2010-01-01
2011-01-01
2012-01-01

	
  

741.52
828.54
956.13
1111.21
1278.54
1395.96
1505.94
1575.79
1731.09
1943.12
2277.66
2534.22
2752.52
3039.85
3309.16
3571.56
3758.49
3961.66
4203.46
4527.04
4846.07
5183.84
5489.37
5902.88
6377.63
6962.89
7628.5
8440.92
9463.53
10535.33
11719.49
12941.04
13807.13
13805.81
13533.87
13196.8
13016.98
12979.7

0.184448535
0.199937259
0.223666604
0.248565037
0.280516916
0.304090969
0.320024651
0.328057209
0.348237779
0.365660519
0.415912203
0.445545808
0.473665915
0.499654827
0.527877744
0.558614865
0.583752427
0.590033213
0.616017938
0.645723741
0.668801667
0.693378989
0.708177878
0.719135509
0.752274175
0.782127492
0.833779633
0.89495213
0.976527706
1.049680672
1.150040724
1.2212676
1.275862611
1.256398566
1.237416341
1.193114422
1.149442806
1.123627896

5379.5
5669.3
5930.6
6260.4
6459.2
6443.4
6610.6
6484.3
6784.7
7277.2
7585.7
7852.1
8123.9
8465.4
8777.0
8945.4
8938.9
9256.7
9510.8
9894.7
10163.7
10549.5
11022.9
11513.4
12071.4
12565.2
12684.4
12909.7
13270.0
13774.0
14235.6
14615.2
14876.8
14833.6
14417.9
14779.4
15052.4
15470.7
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0.191988103
0.20288219
0.215273328
0.227812919
0.246083106
0.27230965
0.293089886
0.319834061
0.337008269
0.343291376
0.358925346
0.369124183
0.380617684
0.395362298
0.4093426
0.427661144
0.443029903
0.455421478
0.470097153
0.479145401
0.490392278
0.499369638
0.504467971
0.512706933
0.52329473
0.541312514
0.560286651
0.572073712
0.585109269
0.599520836
0.61749417
0.636152772
0.655013175
0.674515964
0.682693041
0.69027836
0.711634025
0.720691371

13.78418069
14.61450267
16.12197754
17.74982429
19.79409215
21.66495949
22.78068557
24.30162084
25.51461376
26.70147859
30.02570626
32.2744234
33.8817563
35.90911239
37.70263188
39.92621906
42.04644867
42.7977573
44.1967027
45.75217035
47.68017553
49.138253
49.79968974
51.26965102
52.83256292
55.41408016
60.14080288
65.38432342
71.31522231
76.4870771
82.3252269
88.54507636
92.80981125
93.07120321
93.86852454
89.29185217
86.47777099
83.89859541
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Appendix	
  3:	
  Derivation	
  of	
  consumption	
  model
•

C = CW + CR + D
C = CW + CR + β(C T − CW )
C = CW + CR + βηCR − βCW
C = (1 − β)CW + (1+ βη)CR
If we assume that production workers’ wages are a fraction of supervisory workers’ wages,

€

namely:

W R = φW P
Then it is clear that:

€

C = (1 − β)cW (W PϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (φW P (1 − ϕ)N + Π + iDR )

€
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Appendix	
  4:	
  Derivation	
  of	
  growth	
  model	
  with	
  previous	
  consumption	
  
model
If we impose a temporary equilbrium condtion with the absence of the public sector, we can see
that Y = C + I so:
Y = (1 − β)cW (W PϕN − iDR ) + (1+ βη)cπ (φW PϕN + Π + iDR ) + I
In addition, it is useful to note that:
€
W ϕN
W PϕN = P
*Y = ω PY
Y
and
Π
*Y = πY
Y
Where ωP is the production workers’ share of income, and π is the profit share of income. Once
€
we do this, if we divide both sides by K to obtain a formula for the utilization rate of capacity,
we get:

u = (1 − β)cW ω P u − (1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ φω P u + (1+ βη)cπ πu + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0 + γ 1πu
u − (1 − β)cW ω P u − (1+ βη)cπ φω P u − (1+ βη)cπ πu − γ 1πu = (1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
u(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π ) = (1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
(1 − β)cW idR + (1+ βη)cπ idR + γ 0
u=
(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )

€
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Appendix 5: Calculation of dRmax
We start with the relationship the assumption that the most a consumer can use to service their
debts is 100% of their given income, namely:

iDR max − W P N = 0
Dividing through by k we get

€

dR max =

ωPu
i

If we plug-in for u, we get a relationship that requires a u that is dependent on the maximum

€
value of dR, so we can solve for dR:

dR max =

(1 − π )(−cW dR max i(1 − β) + γ 0 + cπ dR max i(1+ βη))

i(1+ φ )(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )
dR max (1+ φ )(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π ) + (1 − π )(cW (1 − β) − cπ (1+ βη)

γ 0 (1+ φ )(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ1π )
i
γ 0 (1+ φ )(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π )
dR max =
i(1+ φ )(1 − (1 − β)cW ω P − (1+ βη)cπ φω P − (1+ βη)cπ π − γ 1π ) + (1 − π )(cW (1 − β) − cπ (1+ βη)
=

€
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